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Abstract
The normative foundations required by the EU have been cast
variously in the literature in terms of an economic, social,
constitutional or cultural bond.  This essay proposes a shift in focus
to what may be called the political bond, understood as people’s
sense of sharing in each other’s predicaments and fate.  Although
rarely discussing it explicitly, existing approaches generally imply
that this bond is uniform across issue-areas.  Some of the basic
insights of political psychology suggest that this may be an
unsustainable assumption, and research will be needed to
investigate whether populations perceive the political bond more
widely in some issue domains than others, a finding which would
have implications for institutional design.
Normative Foundations for a Disputed Polity
The need to engage ordinary citizens in the workings of the EU was
not widely insisted upon for much of the Community’s development.
Early theorists of the integration process candidly focused on elites:
‘it is as impracticable as it is unnecessary,’ suggested Ernst Haas,
‘to have recourse to general public opinion.’ (Haas 1958: 16).  What
was important was the creation of an economic bond between
professionals, through the functional integration of technical tasks
(Monnet 1963). For most commentators, European integration was
framed by a ‘permissive consensus’ amongst the wider populations
– an euphemistic concept whose overtones of sober reflection were
somewhat disingenuous and certainly little tested.  Only in the early
1990s, largely as a result of changes made in the Maastricht Treaty,1
did the popular dimension become a serious one in EU scholarship.
Little agreement has emerged in that time, however, regarding
the bonds between citizens necessary for the EU to achieve the
political consent that it needs.  The economic bond implied by
functional integration is today generally considered too thin a basis
for a Union whose tasks extend well beyond the economic. At least
three alternative approaches can be found in the literature, focusing
variously on what can be termed the ‘social bond’, the ‘bond of
constitutional patriotism’ and the ‘cultural bond’.
The first of these is most associated with the work of Claus Offe,
who argues that underlying any viable polity there must be the
‘indispensable civic infrastructure’ of ‘trust’ and ‘solidarity’ between
citizens – trust understood as the belief that other citizens will
undertake their civic duties, solidarity as the willingness to comply
in situations where others and not oneself are the beneficiaries (Offe
2000: 4-5).2   Neither belief, Offe emphasises, can be created from
above by formal design: ‘before citizens can recognise the authority
of the state, they must first mutually recognise each other as being
motivated by – and hence reciprocally worthy of – trust and
solidarity’ (Offe 2000: 5).  The state can do no more than develop
what already exists.  Offe has suggested that an ‘idea of liberation’
may be required to generate the sense of unity between people
under which trust and solidarity can flourish, ‘be it liberation from
the rule of oppressive or exploitative foreign … powers or liberation
from princely particularism, arbitrariness, unjust oppression, and
belligerent passions. … Europe,’ he believes, ‘does not hold the
promise of liberation.’  The EU, one therefore concludes, cannot by
itself create a ‘European demos’ (Offe 2003: 76).
Jürgen Habermas, foremost amongst those associated with the
‘constitutional patriotist’ approach,3  shares the same basic concern
as Offe but adopts a more activist stance.  ‘Social solidarity,’ he
writes, ‘has hitherto been limited to the nation-state; it must be
widened to embrace all citizens of the EU.’  Crucially, he sees this
as a process that can be furthered by legal structures: ‘peoples
come into being … only with their state constitutions’ (Habermas
2002: 230).4   An EU Constitution would, he believes, have a
‘catalytic effect’ on the creation of EU-wide social solidarity
(Habermas 2001a: 13): it would give tangible form to a ‘political
culture’ which the peoples of Europe already share in their common
traditions of civic rights and democratic participation.5   Popular
recognition of these basic affinities, in the form of allegiance to a
constitution, is taken as constituting a bond between peoples sufficient
to negate any differences of a cultural kind.
Such shared values are likely, of course, to be rather general in
character and not limited to the populations that they claim to bind.
As one critic David Miller writes, ‘subscribing to them marks you out
as a liberal rather than a fascist or an anarchist, but it does not
provide the kind of political identity that nationality provides’ (Miller
1995: 163).  Miller and others have emphasised the importance of
a cultural bond between citizens, antecedent to the institutional
loyalties referred to by Habermas and the condition of the social
bond described by Offe.  Anthony Smith refers to this bond as
‘collective cultural identity … a sense of shared continuity on the
part of successive generations of a given unit of population, and to
shared memories of earlier periods, events and personages in the
history of the unit … [and] the collective belief in a common destiny
of that unit and its culture.’ (Smith 1992: 58). Of course, the origins
of ‘identity’ are as elusive as those of ‘trust’ and ‘solidarity’, which
means that these authors understandably prefer to focus on the
conditions under which they believe collective identity cannot emerge
rather than postulate those under which it may.  Their analyses, like
Offe’s, have a pessimistic flavour.  ‘The absence of a European
communication system,’ writes Dieter Grimm, ‘due chiefly to
language diversity, has the consequence that for the foreseeable
future there will be neither a European public nor a European political
discourse.’ (Grimm 1995: 296).
Each of these analyses of the normative foundations of the EU
makes a significant assumption that  may  be questioned.  It regards
the way that non-elites conceive of politics in Europe and how they
situate themselves in its processes.  The point is perhaps best
highlighted by avoiding for now the notions of social, constitutional
and cultural bonds and reframing discussion in terms of an explicitly
political bond.  In its weak form, this political bond can be understood
as a sense of shared predicament felt by a set of individuals or
groups, the sense that their problems are the same; in its strong form
it is when such individuals / groups not only feel themselves facing
the same problems but also see their fates as entwined and therefore
needing to be addressed collectively.  It is the sense of being ‘locked
in’ to a situation together, something which is crucial to any political
community.
Whether this analytical distinction between shared predicament
and shared fate may be maintained in practice is a question for
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4empirical study.  Even the two combined (i.e. a strong political bond)
may be insufficient to sustain a polity – the relationship after all is a
pragmatic one.  It is not – at first, at least – the very fact of sharing
which in itself is of value, but rather the advantages of doing so
when faced with the demands of a particular situation.6   What is
important though is that arguably, at least as far as concerns
strangers, a sense both of shared predicament and shared fate must
develop before any social bond of solidarity can do so.  This much,
one imagines, would be little disputed by the ‘solidaritists’ and the
constitutional-patriotists – it is something implied by Offe’s notion of
the unifying ‘idea of liberation’, and it is present in Habermas to the
extent that the constitutional values to be celebrated ‘stand for’
something and thus are a ‘stand against’ other, more dangerous,
things.  Culturalists might be more sceptical, arguing that a sense of
shared fate is derivative of outward signs of collectivity such as
language, appearance and territory.  But even they would
presumably acknowledge that not all such cultural markers come to
be ascribed normative significance, nor do those that have
necessarily maintain it.  The sense of shared predicament, even in a
culturalist interpretation, can be considered important as a criterion
of which cultural markers carry enduring meaning.
Despite implying such a political bond, these authors seem to
take for granted that its structure will be uniform across issue-areas.
That is, it is assumed that people cannot feel a sense of shared
predicament in one issue-area without at the same time feeling it in
all issue-areas.  Common to most of the authors is a tendency to
think in terms of horizontal layers of what is shared (i.e. European)
and not shared (national or subnational) by the peoples of Europe,
a ladder-of-generality approach which allows little nuancing
according to issue-area.  Consider Offe’s notions of trust and
solidarity: ‘Europeans,’ he writes, ‘still think of themselves primarily
in national terms; they have not yet developed the relations of trust
and solidarity on the European level that would be necessary to
underpin a stronger European governing capacity.’ (Offe 2000:
12)  This implication is clearly that of monolithic layers.  A similar
conceptual framework can be found in the constitutional-patriotist
approach: J.H.H. Weiler envisages European citizens having
‘contemporaneous membership in an organic national-cultural
demos and in a supranational civic, value-driven demos’ (Weiler
1995: 256), whilst Habermas expresses the same with his notion of
a shared political culture.  His occasional use of the vocabulary of
identity also rules out sensitivity to the specificity of different issue-
areas.7   A layered model is invoked most straightforwardly by the
culturalists: ‘in the ancient world,’ writes Smith, ‘it was possible to
be Athenian, Ionian and Greek all at the same time; in the medieval
world, to be Bernese, Swiss and Protestant; in the modern Third
World to be Ibo, Nigerian and African simultaneously.  Similarly,
one could feel simultaneously Catalan, Spanish and European; even
– dare one say it? – Scottish-or-English, British and European.’ (Smith
1992: 67-8).
Such a conceptual model is certainly attractive, since it coheres
with the notion of multi-level government.  The notion of tiers of identity
lends legitimacy to the notion of tiers of government.  But it may be
restrictive of normative discussion of the EU’s future.  For if trust and
solidarity (the social bond) can be said to emerge only once the
sense of shared predicament and fate (the political bond) has
developed, the proper subject of investigation surely needs to be
the institutional structures which are capable of managing that
transition.  This is, however, precisely what the authors cited do not
explore, because the vocabulary and the conceptual frameworks
they use are not appropriate to conceiving of that ‘messy phase’ in
which the boundaries concerning with whom predicaments and fate
are shared may vary significantly according to issue-area.8   The
evolution of the political bond goes unexplored because it is assumed
to be something which is unitary and uniform.
It might be objected, of course, that to criticise existing normative
theory for its presumption of the consistency of popular beliefs is to
make an overly literal reading of it.  It necessarily operates, one
might point out, at a certain level of abstraction, is intended to be
prescriptive rather than descriptive, and so to argue against it on
the grounds of descriptive inaccuracy is unhelpful, perhaps naïve.
Such critiques, it might be said, are ‘behaviouralist’, and do not
intersect with the concerns of political philosophy.  To take this
position, however, would be to immunise such theory from all criticism
other than that related to its internal logic.  Clearly, what one can
normatively advocate is inseparable from the starting-point that is
one’s understanding of reality.  If a certain level of coherence in
mass views is an ideal to be realised, one first of all needs to engage
with these views as they are now, since this may suggest how they
will evolve.
Prima facie, there are reasons to suppose that the political bond
is not uniform.  By way of an anecdotal illustration, consider the two
Irish referenda on the Nice Treaty, which differed in outcome largely
according to which issue-area was the dominant frame: in the first,
the No-campaign successfully presented the vote as a referendum
on institutional clarity and representation; in the second, the Yes-
campaign was able to present it as a referendum on extending the
economic benefits of EU membership to the candidate countries of
Central and Eastern Europe.  The voting outcome was quite different
in each case, not least because there was no consistency of views
across these two issue-areas.9   As another example of disparity,
consider the often-noted unity between the populations of Europe
(not their governments) at the time of the 2003 Iraq war – a sense
of shared predicament and fate in foreign policy (the need
collectively to oppose a US-led war) which was not simultaneously
evident in other policy areas such as immigration, where the shifting
of obligations to neighbouring countries has remained a political
vote-winner.
Looking at the political bond means looking, for any given-issue
area, at how widely people cast the boundary of those facing a
shared predicament, and – more than this – a shared fate.  For
research concerned with the EU, the question of shared predicament
can be stated in practical terms (operationalised) as that of whether
a given social group sees the whole range of political issues as
domestic (the difference between national and regional of less
interest here) or whether there are some which it sees in wider terms
as transnational in origin and scope.  Whether a sense of shared
predicament implies also a sense of shared fate can be addressed
by looking at whether those issue-areas seen as transnational are
also considered to require policy-making formed at a higher than
national level, be this by intergovernmental or supranational political
means, or by non-governmental actors.
The Political Bond as a Set of Beliefs
I have argued that the political bond tends to be treated in unitary
form without attention to possible variation between issue-areas: it
tends, one can therefore say, to be considered as an integrated
belief system, defined by the political psychologist Philip E. Converse
as ‘a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are
bound together by some form of constraint or functional
interdependence.’ (Converse 1964: 207).
5This notion of ‘constraint’ is a critical one.  Converse’s major
work, ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’ (1964) is still
held as one of the seminal texts in political psychology.  Its subject
of study is the left-right political spectrum and how far it is invoked
as an organising principle by the ordinary American voter.
‘Constraint’ is introduced as a means by which to assess the degree
of ideological consistency exhibited by an individual.  ‘In the static
case,’ writes Converse, ‘“constraint” may be taken to mean the
success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that
an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further
ideas and attitudes. …  In the dynamic case, “constraint” or
“interdependence” refers to the probability that a change in the
perceived status (truth, desirability, and so forth) of one idea-element
would psychologically require, from the point of view of the actor,
some compensating change(s) in the status of idea-elements
elsewhere in the configuration.’ (Converse 1964: 207-8).  An
illustration from domestic politics would be as follows: an individual
is known to advocate the socially progressive policy of positive
discrimination in the workplace in favour of under-represented ethnic
minorities.  To what extent can one infer from this that he or she is
also the holder of economically progressive views on wealth
redistribution, and to what extent would a revaluation of the worth
of positive discrimination (due let us say to statistics that convince
the individual it benefits recent immigrants over the native-born)
necessitate a reorientation on the question of wealth distribution?
Converse distinguishes between three different sources of
constraint: logical, psychological and social.  The first is the most
straightforward: when two views are inseparable or incompatible
for reasons of logic (though the logic may sometimes go unnoticed).
Psychological sources of constraint are likely to be more common:
here the component idea elements are experienced by those initiated
in the belief system as being logically constrained, each following
one from another, even though to the outsider the relationship might
appear more arbitrary and a matter of ‘cultural accumulation’.
(Converse 1964: 210)   In the case of the third type, the social
sources of constraint, perceived group interests are active in shaping
the belief system, which may often be a legitimisation device (an
ideology) for the pursuit of these interests.
The concept of constraint can be applied to the political bond
as introduced above.  The belief system concerns with whom
predicaments and fate are understood to be shared; its idea-elements
are the beliefs held on this for any given issue-area.  Here too,
constraint can be derived from a logical, a psychological or a social
source.  Logically, one cannot view environmental pollution as a
shared predicament (because it does not respect borders) without
at the same time considering as a shared predicament the macro-
economic health on which depends a particular country’s ability to
control environmental pollution.  The belief about the one constrains
– albeit perhaps purely logically – the belief about the other.
Psychological sources of constraint can be found in neoliberal beliefs
about the proper form of a common market: the idea, for example,
that the ‘four freedoms’ of movement – labour, goods, services and
capital – must go together.  There is at least the veneer of logic,
though it is dependent on a prior acceptance of certain value
preferences, for example that long-term macro-economic benefits
outweigh short-term socio-economic disruption.  An illustration of
social sources of constraint can be found in various brands of
Euroscepticism, where the notion that predicaments and fate are
shared in any issue-area tends to be consistently opposed: consider
the undifferentiated hostility to the EU shown by the regulation-wary
Murdoch press in Britain, or that to be found in much of the British
Conservative Party, seemingly inspired by the desire to maintain, in
the face of erosion from Brussels, the sovereignty of the natural ruling
class of Britain.  Belief systems, it should be noted of course, are not
free of the interference of other, more ‘central’, belief systems:
Margaret Thatcher, for example, was hostile to the European
Community in most areas of political life, but her free-market ideology
and commitment to European defence were yet stronger, hence her
advocacy of the EC common market and certain applications of
the ecu, plus the development of the Western European Union.
(Thatcher 1988).
The concrete examples just given concern the beliefs of elites –
newspapers and political platforms.  What of the lay voter?  Using
this terminology from political psychology, one can say that in
assuming that the political bond is uniform, the existing literature
assumes strong constraint – whether derived from logical,
psychological or social sources – across popular conceptions of
shared predicament and shared fate from one issue-area to another.
This, however, goes against the most basic point which Converse
wishes to stress, and which has become established orthodoxy in
the field of political psychology:10  that other than for elites the
exercise of constraint across the range of idea-elements of any given
belief-system tends to be sporadic at best.  Knowledge of ‘what
goes with what’, and why, is information that has to be diffused
from above, and ‘very little information “trickles down” very far.’
(Converse 1964: 213)  In contrast to those who assume a strong
role for political discourse and the media in shaping popular beliefs,
Converse talks of ‘a basis discontinuity between the “message-as-
sent” and the “message-as-received”.’ (Converse 1975: 81)  The
fallacy is therefore to assume that the constraint one recognises at
the elite level is replicated in the population at large.11   Irregular
sets of beliefs, rather than systems of beliefs, may be the norm.  Hence
the problem of assuming a uniform political bond.
To question the degree of constraint between idea-elements does
not necessarily imply questioning the degree of consistency within
them, i.e. the extent to which people adopt the same stance with
regard to shared predicament and/or fate on different specific issues
within the same general issue-area (two specific hazards, for
example, both connected to the broader problem of environmental
pollution).  Some recent research has sought to emphasise the
‘consistency within’ that can derive from the way political parties
and the media bundle together specific issues so that new information
is set in the context of old.12   Politicians and commentators tend not
to address the question of immigration, for example, from a radically
different perspective from one day to the next.  Likewise there is
likely to be some consistency in whatever daily experiences (those
connected to occupation for example) may also inform an
individual’s political views.
One must be careful, of course, not to slip back into the
assumption of a perfect transfer of information from those ‘sending’
to those ‘receiving’.  Also, to assume a very high degree of
‘consistency within’ does beg questions regarding how a belief
system can, as we may expect that it does, evolve.  It makes sense
therefore to take up another concept of Converse’s – ‘centrality’ –
which allows us to speak of some idea-elements being more stable
than others.  Centrality can be divided into two types, motivational
and cognitive (Converse 1970; 1975: 96-7).  Loosely defined,
motivational centrality refers to the perceived importance of an idea-
element to the subject, cognitive centrality to the proportion of mental
time which is invested in it.  The second of these is a more helpful
concept in two respects:13  research has suggested that it is a more
reliable guide to attitude stability (that ‘knowing more’ about a issue
is what leads to consistency of views over time rather than ‘caring
more’14 ); also it is likely to be easier to measure.15
6The concept is useful for two reasons, the first being simply that
it encourages one to avoid the trap of thinking that all popular
attitudes are in a state of random flux, which clearly would be
devastating from a political theoretical perspective.  This is a much
discussed problem in political psychology and there is a spectrum
of views regarding the stability of popular attitudes, ranging from
those inclined to ascribe evidence of widespread instability to faulty
research methodology or real changes in the object-environment,
to those who are dubious as to the very existence of ‘true attitudes’.16
Significantly, even those at the radically sceptical end acknowledge
the possibility that issue-areas that are cognitively central for a subject
may be seen with consistency over time.  The argument of John
Zaller, for instance, is that publics generally have a plurality of things
that they could say about an issue and that when asked they pick
the one which – for one reason or another – happens to be at the
top of their minds (due to chance factors such as the headlines of
yesterday’s news, or to systemic factors such as how the question
was framed). (Zaller 1992: 54)  It is a position which has attracted
a great deal of criticism for being overly reductive,17  but it is notable
that even Zaller does not dismiss the significance of cognitive
centrality: ‘persons who are highly engaged with an issue may ...
develop the crystallised attitudes that most opinion researchers take
to be the norm.’18  This is an important qualification of his point, and
Converse too deliberately seeks to warn against an overly pessimistic
interpretation of his observations: ‘they are frequently misinterpreted
as saying that not much of anybody has political opinions about
much of anything.  This is a disastrous misconstruction, for it fits no
data at all.  On any kind of reasonable item that taps a major policy
debate, a substantial fraction of the electorate suffers no gross
deficiencies of information and has highly developed and often
vehement positions of its own.’ (Converse 1975: 83)  Note also
that the sense of shared predicament is defined rather less
demandingly than Zaller’s ‘crystallised opinions’ or Converse’s
‘vehement positions’: it refers to ‘ways of seeing’ (e.g. transnational
versus domestic) rather than specific beliefs per se19 , and the
assumption is that, for issue-areas which are cognitively central to
them, whilst people may show (regardless of real changes in the
environment) some inconsistency over time vis-à-vis themselves in
this, nonetheless they are still likely to show consistency in their
difference from other people.20
The second reason the concept is important is that it allows one
to speak of how a set of beliefs may evolve.  In our earlier discussion
constraint was taken to be a property of a belief system as a whole.
This is correct, in that idea-elements entirely unconstrained by other
idea-elements may be said to exist outside the belief-system
altogether; however, it is also true that constraint will be stronger
between some idea-elements than between others, according to
their centrality to the subject.  Two fictional illustrations may serve to
make this clearer, one concerning the sense of shared predicament,
the other the sense of shared fate.  Consider first a French blue-
collar worker – a bus-driver, for instance – whose interest in the
problem of transborder environmental pollution is generally not
great.21   He lived through the Chernobyl crisis as an adolescent but
remembers it only vaguely as a problem that affected the East.  The
environment is barely a political issue for him.  Then one day he
hears a radio news feature concerning British beef, its possible
contamination from BSE and the latent threat of a pandemic of
Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease; the import of British beef has been
suspended but the damage may already have been done, and
suddenly he is one of thousands of listeners ringing in to demand
answers.  The persistent recollection of some awful Normandy
barbecue ignites a whole range of new interests in the man: naturally
he becomes sensitive to other potential transnational threats in the
area of food hygiene (now a central issue-area to him), and he
willingly starts to regard GMO foods as a US-versus-Europe issue;
but the importance of other issue-areas is awakened also, other
transnational hazards are recognised, including environmental
pollution, and oil spills from the Bay of Biscay to the Baltic suddenly
take on significance as ‘symptomatic’ of a wider problem.  Whether
this is just a political phase he goes through before ultimately
returning to a state of apathy is not important here, nor whether he
sees one political institution or another as providing a regulatory
solution: what is important is how a change in the status of a central
issue-area (its ‘transnationalisation’) affects the status of other, less
central issue-areas.
A second illustration concerns the question of shared fate;
conceive of a middle-manager of a small Bavarian cheese-
manufacturing company.  She is a supporter of the recently
introduced euro as it has benefited the export of her cheese.  She
thinks the EU is a good thing in various other respects too – in
caring for the environment, for example, and generally helping third-
world countries.  Over a discussion one evening, a politically-minded
former school friend draws her attention to the fact that the EU has
a bad track record of managing overseas development aid and
argues that this is ‘typical of Brussels incompetence’.  The complaint
falls on deaf ears though, and sensing her cheese-manufacturing
friend is unimpressed she switches to the inability of the EU member
states to agree a common position on the Iraq war that is filling the
airwaves.  Our middle-manager believes wars are bad regardless
of who wages them, and prefers not to think about it.  A third friend
joins them, is updated on the conversation and fair-mindedly points
out that EU development aid has actually become considerably
more efficient in the last five years relative to the national programmes
of the EU-15, and that several African countries are benefiting.  The
conversation strays.  Some months later, however, back at the office,
our middle-manager receives from the senior manager a Powerpoint
presentation illustrating how profits have fallen due to inflationary
costs since the introduction of the euro.  The graphs are well laid-out
and powerful.  Her view of supranational currency regulation
changes.  She starts to see it as bad for German manufacturing, a
subversive imposition from Brussels.  Suddenly, with the vehemence
of a convert, she becomes hostile towards all outside meddling in
domestic economic affairs and resents EU activity in this field.  Rather,
the EU should stick to managing the environment and helping third-
world countries.  In summary: new information concerning less central
issue-areas was glossed over by the subject, indicating low constraint
between these issue-areas; but a subsequent revaluation of a central
issue-area did cause a revaluation of the extent of shared fate, though
without consequence for the less central issue-areas.
Centrality can act as a guide, then, to the patterns by which
beliefs may spill over from one issue-area to another, and to the
kinds of new information which might be required to inspire this. It
was suggested above that – at least as concerns the left-right political
spectrum, the subject of most of the relevant literature – for any
given issue-area there will be a significantly sized group of people
to whom it is cognitively central and so of whom relatively stable
ways of seeing can be expected.  These groups, generally minority
sub-divisions of the broader population, have been labelled ‘issue
publics’, to one or several of which any individual may belong.22
To a degree, differences in education levels may account for variation
in the number of issue publics to which an individual belongs, though
it is also a matter of accumulation: those who know more can make
better use of new information, and so those who are informed about
several issues are likely to be informed about many.23   Between the
7extremes of those who are entirely unengaged politically and those
who are engaged in a very broad range of political issues, affiliation
to an issue public is likely to correspond partly to the issues of greatest
salience in public life and partly to the issues raised in the course of
daily personal activity.
With regard to our investigation of the political bond in the
populations of Europe, it can be stated that the members of an issue
public are those who not only accept a given issue-area as being
political (on which politicians can be held accountable) but also
who devote an amount of time to thinking about it, have some degree
of knowledge concerning it, and – as a derivation of these – are
likely to show some degree of consistency over time in the way they
regard it.  Certainly the members of an issue public will not
necessarily feel in that issue-area either a shared predicament or a
shared fate with others across borders; in some they may, in others
not.  This is where constraint comes back in – the degree to which
disagreement on this can be tolerated.  And this, as was suggested
above, is likely to correspond to the relative centrality of the issue-
areas in question.
The Political Bond in Europe: a Research Agenda
What has been presented here is a thesis: that the political bond
may not be as uniform as implied in the literature.  It does, however,
face counter-objections.  Could it be, for example, that today’s mass-
media-age European publics are politically more sophisticated than
the US population of the 1950s/60s, and that the weakness of
constraint to be found in the one should not be inferred in the
others?24   Possibly, but in studying the left-right political divide
Converse was studying a belief system invoked fairly regularly in
daily political life, and generally uncontested as an organising
framework for political ideas.  The idea-elements were at least
packaged according to the belief-system, even if they were not
reliably received in this form by the bulk of the population.  This
cannot usually be said of the belief system concerning the political
bond in today’s Europe.  Indeed, the significance of borders in a
general sense tends to be considered quite rarely (Britain’s
Eurosceptic press being something of an exception, and even this
being rather less consistent than one might imagine25 ): rather, it
seems fair to say that discussion in public discourse tends to be
issue-driven, at most asking ‘are other countries facing this problem
too, and can anything be done about it transnationally?’.  To expect
populations to reconstruct the belief system in full from the isolated
idea-elements in this way is, ostensibly at least, unrealistic, and so
constraint between these elements can hardly be assumed.
Indeed, ongoing structural changes in the way that knowledge
is acquired would seem only to diminish the likelihood of such
constraint.  Whilst the point is sometimes over-emphasised, it remains
true that today people draw their news increasingly not just from
the television or the pages of a newspaper but from the internet, a
medium which invites the user to see only that which they wish to
see, to filter what it is that they are exposed to.  Online news sources
can be tailored to the interests and preferences of the individual
user, a phenomenon which has been referred to as resulting in ‘The
Daily Me’ [Negroponte 1995; Sunstein 2001].  Thematised
chatrooms and email groups encourage specialisation, the in-depth
exploration of a select number of topics.  The result is that, despite
the continued importance of the traditional media in projecting the
major news stories, populations are no longer exposed to a single
harmonised news agenda to anything like the same degree as for
much of the twentieth century.  Rather, subgroups may become more
and more immersed in the few topics which they consider important
to them, with relatively few occasions to stumble upon new issues
by accident.  The internet encourages the formation of ‘issue publics’
in other words.  The overall belief system may recede into the
background, suggesting once more that there may not be strong
constraint in beliefs across the range of political issue-areas.  The
internet perhaps also encourages those who are part of an issue
public to adopt a broader-than-national perspective, since territorial
boundaries do not limit what they are exposed to and the discussions
that they may participate in.  The nature of the issue itself, rather
than simply the way it is packaged in the conventional media, may
increasingly determine the dimensions of the political space it is
seen to be operating within.
Objections remain however.  Why, for example, treat the sense
of shared predicament and shared fate in a given issue-area as
prior to a social bond, rather than expecting (in a more culturalist
vein) people to identify with one another on the basis of markers of
some outward kind, from which they infer a shared fate and
predicament?   If the latter were the case, the political bond might
retain a degree of uniformity.  Those in the field of political
psychology who study heuristics might support this objection.  Once
people know what they think of a particular out-group, for example,
this may allow them to display attitudes towards any issue connected
to that group with some consistency.  With regard to the political
bond in Europe one might reason that if high proportions of people
are simply xenophobic in a general sense (i.e. they employ the
heuristic ‘outsiders are bad and to be avoided’) this may lead them
to refuse to see themselves sharing any predicament or fate with
others across borders.
Before someone can apply a xenophobia heuristic to a particular
issue-area though they will need to have the requisite information
that allows them to think of the issue-area a) as political, and b) as
transnational in dimension.  Such information levels may be expected
to be present for some issue-areas but not for others;26  this in itself
suggests that the political bond is likely to be displayed in irregular
fashion.  Also, the importance of visual markers varies significantly
according to context: consider the attitude of a football crowd to a
foreign player on their team.  It is his ability that generally determines
whether he is viewed favourably or not, with criticism relating to his
status as a foreigner normally coming only once he has shown himself
to be incompetent in advancing the team’s cause.  The predicament,
rather than the markers to which a xenophobia heuristic might be
applied, seems to be the key.27
But this is still to a large extent conjecture, and the need for
some empirical research is evident.  We do not know whether
population groups do in fact perceive shared predicament and
shared fate more widely in some issue-areas than others, and with
what stability over time.  Findings on these questions would be
important whether one’s political vision of Europe were federalist,
sceptical or ‘pragmatic’, though in advance of such findings one
needs to keep comments regarding the possible implications for
institutional design to a minimum.  Clearly, if constraint between
issue-areas turned out to be high, or if affiliation to more than one
issue public were rare, then it might be possible to continue thinking
in terms of ‘shifting politics’ to the ‘European level’ or ‘maintaining
it’ at the ‘national level’. If, alternatively, it seemed that substantial
portions of the electorate were a part of more than one issue public,
but held the political bond differently for each, a more complex
approach might be necessary.
Embedding flexibility in the EU’s institutional structure would be
only part of the answer.  A legal application of the principle of
8subsidiarity, still the generally favoured approach, would probably
look insufficient, since the weak link between institutional structures
and popular beliefs would mean the simple fact of changing
competences on specific issue-areas would risk going unappreciated.
Even if it were appreciated, more would need to be known about
the stability of people’s views before such changes could be
considered meaningful responses to beliefs.  Moreover, assuming
some disagreement across groups within countries, and between
countries, there would be no institutional arrangement of
competences, in the absence of a social bond, capable of satisfying
all.
Arguably the key would be not only to ensure that the possibility
of change is present in the institutional structures but also to ensure
– and to publicise – the political, rather than legal, character of the
review process that looked at such questions.  This, after all, is how
disagreement and deficits in knowledge are generally managed.
But a political review process conducted by whom?  The challenge
of institutional design would be to conceive of the forum in which
such a process could be conducted: a forum able to command
political consent both from those whose sense of shared fate on a
particular issue extended beyond the borders of their state, and
from those who did not even regard the issue in question as of
transnational origin and scope.
Endnotes
1 Crucially the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting into
the Council’s decision-making process, weakening the claim of
national governments to be able to represent their citizens’ interests
on all issues.
2 Similar ideas are pursued by the same author elsewhere (Offe
1999).  For a statistical study of trust in the EU populations see
Niedermayer (1995).
3 For others taking an essentially similar approach, see Cronin
(2003) and Giddens (2000).
4 The European lawyer J. H. H. Weiler, though for different
reasons retaining some scepticism regarding an EU constitution,
likewise points out that ‘although conceptually the nation is the
condition for the State, historically, it has often been the State which
constituted the nation by imposing a language and/or prioritising a
dialect ands/or privileging a certain historical narrative and/or
creating symbols and myths.’ (Weiler 1995: 239)
5 Note, for instance, how he speaks of the ‘new awareness of
what Europeans have in common [finding] … an admirable
expression in the EU Charter of Basic Rights.’ (Habermas 2001a:
21)
6 Charles Taylor distinguishes between convergent and common
goods (1995: 190-1): ‘we enjoy security from various dangers
through our system of national defence, our police forces, our fire
departments … in my language they are convergent [goods],
because all this concerns only how we have to go about providing
them … In the unlikely event that an individual could secure it [the
good] for himself, he would be getting the same valued condition
that we all get now from social provision.’  Whereas (1995: 192)
‘the bond of solidarity with my compatriots in a functioning republic
is based on a sense of shared fate, where the sharing itself is of
value.’  The distinction is broadly the same as that made in political
science between utilitarian and affective support for a polity.
7 Habermas 2001a: 17: ‘what forms the common core of a
European identity is the character of the painful learning process it
has gone through, as much as its results. It is the lasting memory of
nationalist excess and moral abyss that lends to our present
commitments the quality of a peculiar achievement.’
8 Of course, whether the peoples of Europe are currently in
such a transition phase (in the sense that their attitudes are ‘going
somewhere’) is not clear.  A fractured political bond may simply be
the hallmark of a post-modern condition in which politics is
decentralised and lacks cohesion.  But this is a secondary point.
9 The point should not be overstated – voting in the second
referendum was of course not independent of the outcome of the
first, and so the framing of the issues clearly not the sole factor
involved.
10 The main counter-position is that represented in the
scholarship on heuristics, which is covered at the end of this essay.
11  The degree of constraint between issue-areas does not
automatically invite a value judgement regarding citizen
competence.  Naturally, one man’s constraint is another man’s
dogmatism, and quite reasonable arguments can be made for why
some issue-areas should be seen in transnational terms but not others
(consider Thatcher once again).
12 See the later work of Paul M. Sniderman, e.g. Sniderman
and Bullock (2003), drawing on Carmines and Layman (1997: 283-
316).
13 It may well be of course that the two tend to go together –
people who know more about something care more about it (though
not necessarily the other way round).
14 See Zaller (1992: 68-9).  C.f. Sniderman and Bullock (2003:
599): ‘the better informed they are, the less they are likely to be
handicapped by their absolute lack of knowledge.’
15 Motivational centrality is liable to be treated in a circular
fashion: the only means by which one can ascertain that an issue is
central to a subject in this sense is by noting that their attitudes towards
it remain stable, which is to infer from the consequence back to the
supposed reason.  Cognitive centrality, on the other hand, can be
read from separate indicators such as alertness to new information
and the ability to retain it, plus the interlinkage of an issue with other
issues.
16 For an early discussion of the issues involved see Converse
1970.  For development of these themes, see the authors mentioned
in the following footnotes.
17 See for example Sniderman et al. (2001: 254-88). They
reject Zaller’s argument that people generally ‘make it up as they
go along’ as ‘an extraordinary assertion’ (256) and contend that
his data show greater stability of attitudes over time than he suggests,
also pointing out (266) an apparent contradiction in that if question-
framing is as important as he suggests then asking the same questions
at different times should give rather stable results.
18 Zaller (1992: 54-5).  One feels that one of the reasons he
does not develop this further, and with it the idea of ‘issue publics’
as discussed below, is that the data he is working with does not
allow him to.
19 C.f. the conventional definition of terms (Kavanagh 1983):
an ‘opinion’ is understood as a view on a subject, an ‘attitude’ being
a more general stance, and a ‘belief’ being an attitude deeply held.
920 C.f. Sniderman et al. (2001: 264) on this: ‘even when people
behave differently in one situation than in another, they tend to
respond the same way relative to one another.  A bigot will respond
more negatively to African Americans in some situations than in
others: but in all situations where there is any choice, a bigot will
respond more negatively to African Americans than a person who
is racially tolerant.’  I.e. the effect of situational cues (like question-
framing) will be weaker for some (those that generally know about
that issue) than for others.
21 The following can also be expressed in formal terms, along
the lines of Converse 1970: 185.  Consider an individual X
subscribing to a set of beliefs Y, of which we may single out two
idea-elements, A and B.  New information is given to X resulting in
an imbalance in the set of beliefs Y such that the accustomed ways
of thinking about A and B become incompatible.  How is X likely to
react? If idea-element A is more central to X than B then the way of
thinking about B is likely to change whilst that towards A remains
constant.  If neither A nor B is central to X then the ways of thinking
about neither need change: dissonance between the two may be
tolerated or simply unnoticed (indeed the new information creating
the dissonance may be forgotten).  If both A and B are of high
centrality to X then he may reject the authenticity of the new
information, permitting the ways of seeing both to remain unchanged;
or, if the information is so compelling that it cannot be rejected,
some form of crisis may ensue and a major overhaul of the whole
set of beliefs Y may be required.
22 See Converse (1964: 245).  The concept has been
developed by David J. Elkins (1993).  On the question of how many
issue publics an individual is likely to belong to there is some
disagreement: according to Converse (1964: 218), 17.5% of his
sample of the US population showed no interest whatsoever in
specific issue-related policies; Elkins however, studying the population
of British Columbia thirty years later, emphasises rather a possible
plurality of interests: ‘few people are “single-issue fanatics”’,  he
suggests (1993: 38).
23 For a discussion of the relative importance of education
and partisan involvement as predictors of attitude stability, see
Converse (1975: 103-4).
24 Also to be noted is later research by Converse (1975: 93)
and others suggesting that the American public became more
ideological towards the end of the 1960s and that constraint in the
population of the late 1950s might have been unusually faint; the
difference is one of degree however, and the basic points retain
their validity.
25 See a content analysis of the Daily Mail newspaper during
the 2001/2 saga of the British ‘planespotters’ arrested in Greece,
in White (2003).
26 This criticism of the heuristics approach has been made
before – see Luskin (2002: 286).
27 Even the culturalist David Miller stresses the instrumental
way in which markers tend to be invoked: ‘one can be both Catalan
and Spanish … perhaps emphasising different aspects of the double
identity in different contexts or for different purposes.’ (Miller 2000:
130).
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